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Series. Abstract
Many developing countries have adopted the market approach for expanding the supply
of child care, but little is known about the economic behavior of independent providers. This
paperdrawsonuniquelyrichadministrativedataonchildcarecentersandtheirinputsfromSªo
Paulo to examine the role of local household income in shaping the entry and quality choices
of private suppliers. It documents three main facts: (1) entry rates are considerably higher in
high-income districts; (2) the quality of provision￿as measured by teachers’ schooling, group
size and equipment￿is highly heterogeneous across space and increases systematically with
local household income; and (3) a considerable share of centers operates below recommended
(but not regulated) quality standards, especially in low-income districts. These ￿ndings accord
with a model in which heterogeneous providers optimally adjust the quality of care to the
willingness to pay for quality of local consumers. Market-driven heterogeneity in the quality
of provision across space is a key consideration for understanding the effect of regulations on
the supply of child care.
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11 Introduction
The case for expanding early childhood care has become increasingly compelling in recent years.
A growing body of evidence suggests that enrollment in preschool education has sizable positive
impacts on subsequent educational, behavioral and economic outcomes (Currie and Thomas, 1995;
Garces, Thomas and Currie, 2002; Berlinski et al. 2008, 2009). Drawing on evidence from a series
of studies, Heckman (2006) concludes that early childhood care for disadvantaged children is more
effective than interventions that come later in life, and advocates shifting educational spending to
young disadvantaged children on both ef￿ciency and equity grounds.
Although most countries have committed themselves to expanding child care provision, there
seems to be little consensus on how to actually achieve this objective. While a number of OECD
countries have moved towards universal provision within the public sector, many developing na-
tions have implicitly or explicitly favored the market approach. According to UNESCO (2008), in
2005 the private sector accounted for a median value of 47 percent of total preschool enrollment
in developing countries, versus only 8 percent in high-income nations. In a number of low and
middle-income countries, such as Morocco, Indonesia and Uganda, the private sector was nearly
the sole provider of preschool.1;2
Despite such a prominent role of independent providers in child care markets, little is known
about their economic behavior. Do they primarily target high-income households leaving the poor
behind? Does an unregulated market deliver appropriate levels of quality and safety? How might
we expect regulations to in￿uence the supply and quality of child care? This paper sheds new
light on these questions by examining uniquely rich longitudinal census data on child care centers
and their inputs from one of the world’s largest urban centers: Sªo Paulo, Brazil. This market is
particularly well suited for this analysis, as private provision accounts for a large share of supply
and remains largely unregulated.
To guide the empirical analysis, we adopt an industrial organization approach featuring opti-
mizing behavior and heterogeneity on both sides of the market, drawing on Verhoogen (2008) and
Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009). In the model, a continuum of heterogeneous providers decides on
whether to operate a child care center in each of two geographically segmented markets. Child care
markets are monopolistically competitive and differ in household income and hence on consumers’
willingness to pay for child care quality. To operate a child care center in a given market, providers
must incur a ￿xed and a marginal cost, each of which is potentially market-speci￿c. Within each
market, higher-productivity providers supply higher-quality services. For given productivity, cen-
1These data refer to preschool only. To the best of our knowledge, there are no internationally comparable data on
the share of private enrollment in day care services.
2See also UNESCO (2004).
2ters located in the higher-income market optimally employ higher-quality inputs in order to appeal
to richer consumers. The effect of local household income on entry patterns is less clear-cut in the
model due to the complex interplay between local household income, consumers’ willingness to
pay for child care quality and property rents.
The empirical results suggest that the market approach leads to considerable heterogeneity in
the availability and quality of child care services across locations. Entry rates of independent
providers are considerably higher in high-income city districts, despite higher property rents. This
result is robust to a variety of speci￿cations and to the inclusion of controls for the number (and
size) of public providers. Furthermore, as predicted by the model, the quality of private child
care￿as as measured by teachers’ schooling, group size and equipment￿varies greatly across space
and increases systematically with local household income. Indeed, in the absence of regulation a
considerable share of child care centers operates below recommended (but not imposed) minimum
standards of quality and safety, especially in low-income districts.
This paper contributes to a growing literature on the implications of choice and indepen-
dent supply in education markets, including Manski (1992), Epple and Romano (1998), Nechyba
(2003), Epple, Figlio and Romano (2004), Besley and Ghatak (2005), Urquiola (2005), Hsieh and
Urquiola (2006), Rothstein (2006), Ferreyra (2007) and Epple and Romano (2008). While this
literature has greatly improved our understanding on whether and how households sort between
heterogeneous providers, comparatively little attention has been paid to how educational suppli-
ers choose their location and quality. An important exception is recent work by Urquiola and
Verhoogen (2009), who emphasize the role of household income and institutional constraints in
determining primary schools’ choices of class size. A key prediction, con￿rmed by Chilean data,
is that class size varies endogenously with school productivity and household income, which will
tend to confound attempts to estimate the effects of class size on educational outcomes. In addition
to providing evidence that class size and other school inputs vary endogenously with household
income in a different segment of the education market, a distinguishing feature of this paper is to
emphasize the role of consumer income in shaping providers’ entry choices across heterogeneous
markets.
Our paper also relates to a relatively small literature on the location patterns of private primary
schools in the U.S.. Using cross-sectional data for California, Downes and Greenstein (1996)
relate the number of independent schools in narrowly de￿ned geographic areas to the character
of the population. Barrow (2006) provides related evidence for Illinois, using data for two points
in time. Somewhat surprisingly, both studies ￿nd that the number of private schools in a given
location is either unaffected or decreasing with local mean income. Our ￿ndings suggest that
caution is needed in extrapolating such patterns to other contexts.
Finally, this paper complements recent evidence suggesting that the regulation of child care
3inputs has heterogeneous effects on the supply and quality of care in rich and poor markets. Using
panel data for the United States, Hotz and Xiao (2010) report two main ￿ndings: (1) more stringent
regulations on establishment inputs reduce the number of child care centers, especially in lower-
income markets; and (2) such regulations increase the quality of care, as measured by the share
of establishments accredited by an independent authority, especially in higher-income locations.
Hence they conclude that the costs of regulation are disproportionately felt by consumers in poorer
markets. Importantly, however, the analysis of establishment quality is made dif￿cult by the fact
that providers’ inputs cannot be directly observed and only a small proportion of centers are ac-
credited. The current paper complements this strand of work by providing direct evidence on the
role of local income in shaping providers’ entry and quality choices in the absence of regulation.
As discussed in more detail below, an important suggestion of our analysis is that caution is needed
in inferring quality responses from changes in accreditation rates.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives basic background informa-
tion on the city of Sªo Paulo and its child care market. Section 3 presents a theoretical framework
that links entry and quality choices of private child care providers to local household income. Sec-
tion 4 describes the data employed, before Section 5 provides evidence on the role of local income
in shaping the entry and quality choices of private providers. Section 6 shows that a considerable
proportion of centers in low income districts operate below recommended standards of quality and
safety, and discusses how the imposition of regulations might be expected to impact on the supply
and quality of child care. Section 7 concludes.
2 Background: Sªo Paulo and its Child Care Market
With an estimated population of 10.9 million over 1,523 square kilometers, Sªo Paulo is the largest
municipality in Brazil and one of the world’s largest cities. The municipality is composed of
96 administrative districts, which are characterized by great degree of socioeconomic inequality.
ComputationsoftheHumanDevelopmentIndexbasedonUnitedNationsmethodologyrevealthat,
in the year 2000 a number of city districts score as high as Sweden and Canada, whereas others
score as low as Mongolia and Azerbaijan (Perfeitura da Cidade de Sªo Paulo, 2007). Despite
having the highest income per capita in Brazil, estimates by Marques, Torres and Saraiva (2003)
based on the 2000 population census suggest that about 11.1 percent of the population of the
municipality resided in urban squatter neighborhoods.
Brazilianlawstipulatesthatchildcareiscomposedoftwodifferentlevels: daycareforchildren
aged between 0 and 3 years old, and preschool for those between 4 and 6. In Sªo Paulo, as in the
country as a whole, there are two types of child care providers:
(i) Public child care centers run either by the municipality or the state.
4(ii) Private child care centers run independently.
Public child care centers are funded by the public budget at the municipal, state and federal lev-
els. State legislation mandates that parents wishing to enroll their children in public child care must
do so in a center that is located near their home. Enrollment is not subject to tuition fees, and public
providers cannot reject children unless demand exceeds capacity. The majority of private child care
providers are explicitly for-pro￿t, and centers have full discretion over tuition fees (INEP, 2002).
Most centers provide both levels of child care, although some offer preschool only (especially in
the public sector). Unlike what is observed in most developed countries, the child care market
remains highly unregulated. Although education authorities set minimum recommended standards
on teacher quali￿cations and group size, centers were not bound by strict legal constraints on those
variables.3
The supply of child care recorded a sizable expansion in recent years, a pattern that was com-
mon to many other low and middle income countries (UNESCO, 2008). Panel A of Figure 1
displays the expansion of private and public centers operating in the city during the 2000-2006
period. It shows that the number of private centers grew by 37 percent, while the number of their
public counterparts rose by 29 percent. Although the number of private centers exceeds that of
public centers by about 300 percent, the latter tend to be signi￿cantly larger. In fact, total enroll-
ment in public child care accounted for about 60 percent of the total in this period. As shown in
Panel B of Figure 1, enrollment increased by about 36 percent in both the private and the public
sectors, clearly above the estimated increase in the population aged 0 to 6 (6.5 percent).
3 Theoretical Framework
This section presents a theoretical model that provides a framework for the empirical analysis. We
draw heavily on Verhoogen (2008) and Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009), preserving the structure
and analytical solutions of the former model, whilst adapting it to derive predictions about the entry
and quality choices of private child care providers across heterogeneous districts within a city.
3.1 Household Preferences and Demand
Consider a city composed of two districts, Rich and Poor, indexed by i = R;P. In district i
there is mass of Ci single-child households that resort to the services of a child care center. These
households observe the quality of each of a continuum of child care centers in their own district
3At the time of writing, a legislation proposal on the introduction of group-size caps in child care had reached the
Senate for ￿nal approval (PLS 396/08).
5(indexed by !) and select one of them.4 Households are homogeneous within each district but
differ across districts in a manner we will describe below. The representative household of district
i has an indirect utility function given by:
V (!) = ￿iq(!) ￿ p(!) + " (1)
where q is child care quality, p is the tuition fee, and " is a random term representing the utility of
a particular household-center match. The parameter ￿i captures households’ willingness to pay for
child care quality, which increases with income.5 Households residing in district R have a higher
level of income than those in P and hence have higher willingness to pay for child care quality;
that is: ￿R > ￿P.
Demand for child care in each district takes a multinomial logit formulation, wherein the ran-
dom consumer-center-match term, ", is iid across households with a type-I extreme-value distrib-








where ￿ gives the degree of differentiation between centers, and ￿i is the set of child care centers
available in district i. Child care providers are assumed to be risk neutral, implying that demand
can be written without the expectation operator.
As noted by Verhoogen (2008) and Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009) this formulation of demand
combines vertical differentiation with horizontal differentiation. The vertical component derives
from differences in quality across centers, and implies that if tuition fees were equal across all
centers in district i, higher-quality centers will be more likely chosen by parents. The horizontal
component derives from the random consumer-center-match term, ", and implies that if tuition fees
are the same in every center in district i, enrollment in each center will occur with positive proba-
bility. In contrast to the vertical component, the horizontal attribute of each center has the property
that some parents prefer it while others do not. This implies that a child care center with low
quality and high price may nevertheless be chosen by parents, despite perfect information. In the
present context, this attribute can be interpreted as different (but similarly effective) pedagogical
strategies and/or different geographic locations within a given district.6
4We exclude the possibility that households residing in one district enroll their children in the other. This assump-
tion is justi￿ed by empirical evidence suggesting that few parents will travel long distances to send their children to
child care; see Chipty (1995) and Hofferth et al. (1991) for the United States and Paes de Barros et al. (2009) for Rio
de Janeiro, Brazil.
5As noted by Verhoogen (2008) and Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009) this speci￿cation results from a direct utility
function in which households have identical preferences and differ only in income.
6The horizontal component may also be interpreted as capturing parents’ idiosyncratic perceptions of actual center
63.2 Child Care Production
In the city, there is a continuum of potential child care providers of mass 1. These individuals are
heterogeneous in terms of managerial ability, captured by the exogenous parameter ￿. Child care
markets are geographically segmented, implying that to serve both markets a providers has to set
up two independent centers, indexed by i = R;P. In equilibrium, potential providers optimally
decide on whether to serve both districts, only one, or none.7
The provision of care to one child is assumed to require one teacher, one auxiliary worker,
and physical capital.8 The latter includes several equipment items such as adequate sanitation
facilities, playground, computers, etc. Together with the ability of the entrepreneur, the quality of
















Here, k denotestheamountofcapitalusedforchildcarepurposes, while et andea are, respectively,
the quality of the teacher and the auxiliary worker. One teacher cannot be replaced by many
auxiliary workers, and the qualities of the teacher and auxiliary worker are complementary. To
ensure an interior solution in the choice of quality, the model assumes ￿ ￿ ￿k + ￿t + ￿a < 1.
The cost of capital is represented by the exogenous parameter ￿. Turning to the labor mar-


















i represent the wages for the teachers and auxiliary workers in a center located in
district i, zt and za are positive scalars, and wt and wa represent the average wages of teachers and
auxiliary workers in the outside labor market.9 As emphasized by Verhoogen (2008) these quality-
quality.
7An alternative approach would be to impose that each provider can operate only in one of the two districts. We
have not pursued this path, as in the data it is common to observe centers with similar brand operating in different city
districts. For the US, Hotz and Xiao (2010) are able to identify precisely child care centers af￿liated with a chain, and
report that a chain may have as many as 1,000 establishments. Notice, however, that all results would prevail if we
were to assume that there exists a continuum of local providers in each district, and that each provider decides whether
or not to enter the corresponding district.
8Notice that all these inputs exist in the data. For simplicity, we abstract from choices of group size in modelling
establishment quality. This is the primary focus of Urquiola and Verhogen (2009). Empirically, we would expect
group size to vary with household income, in line with other input choices.
9We will assume throughout that wt and wa are exogenous. This is justi￿ed in our context given that the child care
market is small relative to the local labor market as a whole.
7wage schedules are consistent with a variety of underlying mechanisms. In the present context,
a natural interpretation is similar in spirit to Kremer (1993): the quality of teachers and auxiliary
workers increases with their level of schooling (which is heterogeneous within the two occupa-
tions), and to attract higher-skill professionals in each of these occupations child care centers need
to pay higher wages. In addition, centers located in richer districts may adopt ef￿ciency wage poli-
cies to induce greater worker effort, and thereby provide higher quality services to higher-income
consumers.
To operate a child care center in district i, entrepreneurs have to incur a ￿xed cost Fi. Real-
istically, we assume that FR > FP due to higher property rents in the richer district. For a given
quality level, horizontal differentiation is costless and each center is constrained to offer one va-
riety. As a result, every preschool center differentiates and has a monopoly in the market for its
variety !.
3.3 Market Equilibrium
Child care entrepreneurs set the optimal tuition fee, the teacher and auxiliary worker’s wages, and
capital intensityfor each districtseparately. In district i, eachcenter thinks ofitself as smallrelative
tothemarketasawhole. Hence, privateproviderstreatthedenominatorin(2), whichisdetermined
in market equilibrium, parametrically when making their own decisions. The center-speci￿c qual-
ity is governed by input choices, which together with tuition fees determine enrollment. Formally,




































where ￿ ￿ (zt￿t)￿t(za￿a)￿a(￿k
￿ )￿k and ￿ a mark-up.
3.3.1 Quality, Inputs and Tuition
The model yields intuitive predictions about the quality choices of child care providers within and
across districts. First, within each district, higher-productivity providers run higher-quality centers,
pay higher wages to teachers and auxiliary workers, are more capital intensive, and charge higher
tuition fees. Second, since ￿R > ￿P, providers running child care centers in the two districts will
8choose to provide higher quality and charge higher tuition fees in the richer district. To provide
higher quality care, they employ more quali￿ed teachers and auxiliary workers, pay higher wages
to workers in each of these categories, and are more capital intensive. Third, since each center is
small relative to the market as a whole, quality choices of individual providers are independent of
both market size and the number of centers operating in that market.
3.3.2 Enrollment and Entry
The model is also useful to identify speci￿c channels whereby district attributes may impact on
entrydecisions. Tothisenditisconvenienttowritedowntheexpressionforequilibriumenrollment










i (￿) ￿ 1
￿[(1 ￿ ￿)(￿￿i￿)
1
1￿￿ ￿ (￿ + wt + wa)] is increasing in ￿ and ￿i.10
Pro￿t of a given center is thus given by ￿￿
i(￿) = ￿x￿
i(￿) ￿ Fi and is also increasing in ￿.
Hence, in equilibrium there is a single ability cutoff determining entry in district i. Speci￿cally,
entrepreneurs with managerial ability above ￿
min
i will enter the market and have positive pro￿ts,
whereas less able entrepreneurs will choose not to enter it. The equilibrium level of ￿
min
i is de￿ned















From (7) it can be veri￿ed that ￿
min
i decreases (and thus the number of centers increases) with
Ci, as would be expected. Conditional on Ci, however, the effect of local income per capita on the
number of active centers is generally ambiguous, as local income increases both ￿i and Fi. Further,
under the assumption that the consumer market clears (i.e., that private enrollment equals demand
for private child care services), greater entry in a given district increases the denominator in (6),
thereby lowering equilibrium enrollment of each center.11
3.3.3 Summary
Figure 2 summarizes the main implications of the model for the effect of local income per capita
on entry and quality patterns. We consider two alternative scenarios: panel A assumes higher
equilibrium entry in the richer district, while panel B assumes the converse. In both these cases,
10For further details see Verhoogen (2004, pp. 14-15).
11The assumption that the consumer market clears is not made for its realism, but rather to emphasize that in a long-
term equilibrium enrollment of each center varies endogenously with the number of active centers in each location.
9the upper quality-ability schedule refers to establishments located in the richer district, while the
lower schedule concerns establishments located in the poorer district.12 The solid segments of each
schedule represent the quality of active establishments in each district as a function of entrepre-
neurial ability. The (unweighted) average of establishment quality in each district is represented
by qR and qP.
It is worth noting that, due to heterogeneity of entrepreneurial ability, greater entry in a given
district leads ceteris paribus to lower average establishment quality in that district. Average quality
in the richer district is consequently lower in Panel A than in Panel B. From Panel A, it is also clear
that, while greater entry in the richer district dampens the ￿rst- order positive effect of household
income on average establishment quality, it will not eliminate it as long as quality-ability schedules




P is not too large.
4 Data
We use data on Sªo Paulo’s child care centers, their inputs and average wages, and district at-
tributes. Data on child care centers and their inputs come from the School Census or Censo Esco-
lar (CE) for the years 2000 to 2006. Censo Escolar is a compulsory yearly administrative census
conducted by the Brazilian Ministry of Education, in conjunction with the state-level education
departments. Be￿tting its name, this data set gathers information on all public and private educa-
tional centers in Brazil.13 In each year, it comprises data on enrollment, number of groups, number
of teachers per grade, as well as on the highest schooling level they have achieved. In addition,
it collects information on the infrastructure and equipment of each center, such whether it has ad-
equate sanitation for preschool, a playground, a refrigerator, and the number of computers. An
important feature of these data is the high reliability of the information. Indeed, inspections are
carried out every year on a random sample of centers to ensure that the information is accurately
reported.
Data on average wages of child care teachers are available for 105 private centers in 2006/2007.
The source of this information is a ranking of average wages in private schools constructed by the
teachers’ labor union of Sªo Paulo, which has been circulated by the press.14 Interestingly, this
ranking shows that the distribution of average center wages is very wide: the average wage at the
12This representation assumes CR = CP, as we seek to illustrate the effect of household income on the number and
quality of child care establishments, conditional on the number of children of child care age.
13Although microdata from Censo Escolar are available from 1996, until 1999 the census did not include compre-
hensive information on day care services. Begining in 1997, the Ministry of Education carried out an extensive effort
to include all day care establishments in Censo Escolar, implying that from 2000 this data set can be safely used as a
census of child care establishments (INEP, 2002).
14￿SalÆrios nas escolas particulares de Sªo Paulo variam ate 624% ￿ [Wages in Sªo Paulo’s private schools vary
624%], Folha Online, 03/10/2007.
10top 10 centers is about 600 percent higher than at the bottom 10 centers. Using information on the
name and precise address of each center, we were able to merge these data for 85 centers of the
2006 school census, which are located in 44 city districts.15
Socioeconomicanddemographicinformationonthe96administrativedistrictsofthecitycome
from two sources. Yearly estimates for the population aged up to 6 years old in each city district
come from the Foundation for Data Analysis of the State of Sªo Paulo (SEADE). Also at the
district level, we use data from the 2007 Municipal Atlas on income per capita and the average
years of education of the population aged 25 or older in the years 1991 and 2000. This publication
of the local government gathers several socioeconomic and demographic indicators for each city
district, and is constructed from Brazil’s decennial population census of 1991 and 2000.
Summary Statistics
To make the 96 administrative districts of the city more transparent, Figures 3 and 4 plot the
relationship between various sociodemographic attributes in the year 2000. Figure 3 illustrates
the great degree of spatial inequality that prevails in the city, both with regard to average income
and adults’ schooling. In addition, it reveals that these two variables are highly colinear, i.e., that
higher-income districts also display greater levels of adult education.16 Figure 4 in turn shows that
lower-income city districts tend to have a larger number of children up to 6 years of age.
While center-level data refer to the 2000-2006 period, data on income per capita in each district
are available only for the years 1991 and 2000. To get a sense of how this variable evolves over
time, Figure A.1 in the Appendix displays the relationship between its values in 1991 and 2000. It
is evident that the relative positioning of city districts in terms of income per capita has remained
fairly stable over time, suggesting that the use of 2000 variables to characterize the socioeconomic
attributes of the city over the period of analysis will not likely entail signi￿cant measurement error.
Table 1 reports detailed summary statistics on the panel data employed in the econometric
analysis. Several points are worthy noting. First, the number of private child care centers ex-
hibits signi￿cant heterogeneity across districts. Second, only a minority of day care and preschool
teachers in private centers have attended higher education; preschool teachers in the private sec-
tor display on average signi￿cantly lower levels of schooling than in the public sector, while the
converse happens with day care teachers. Third, private centers tend to run smaller group sizes
than their public counterparts. Finally, the quality of private provision, as measured by group size,
teachers’ schooling and equipment, is highly heterogeneous. Indeed, both teachers’ schooling and
group size tend to be more heterogeneous in the private than in the public sector.
15This imperfect correspondence might re￿ect the fact that the ranking uses data from 2006/2007, whereas Censo
Escolar was sent to educational establishments in March 2006.
16A log-log OLS regression of mean income on average years of education of the population over 25 years yields a
coef￿cient of 3.02, a standard error of 0.055, an R-squared of 0.97 and an F-statistic of 3064.5.
115 Empirical Evidence
5.1 Entry Choices across Districts
We start by examining the role of local household income in shaping entry rates of independent
providers. To this end we start by estimating the following count data speci￿cation:
E(private centersjt jXjt + ￿t) = ￿jt = exp(Xjt￿ + ￿t) (8)
where Xjt is a vector of attributes of district j in year t and ￿t are year ￿xed-effects.
We obtain estimates of the parameters in (8) via Poisson estimation and report the results in
Table 2. The estimates presented in Panel A suggest that the number of private child care centers is
signi￿cantly higher in larger and richer city districts. This pattern holds in the cross-section for the
beginning, middle and end of the sample period, as well as in pooled data; columns (1) to (4). The
estimated effect of household income on private supply is sizable: in the speci￿cation presented
in the top panel of column (4), a 10 percent increase in income per capita is associated with an 8
percent increase in the number of private centers.
In column (5) we assess the extent to which the results are sensitive to the use of data for the
year 2000 to characterize city districts with respect to income per capita. To this end we linearly
extrapolate this variable using 1991 and 2000 values.17 The results remain virtually unchanged.
In columns (6) to (10) we introduce controls for the number of public centers in each district.
Although the model presented in the previous section abstracts from public child care centers,
empirically one might expect the location choices of private providers to be in￿uenced by their
presence. It turns out that the results remain qualitatively unaltered when the number of public
centers in each district is included among the regressors. As a further robustness check, Panel B of
Table 2 reports analogous regressions using the average education of the population over 25 years
old in each district as an alternative measure. This speci￿cation yields similar results, as would be
expected given the very high degree of colinearity between mean income and average education
reported in the previous section.
In Table 3 we examine how entry of private centers is in￿uenced by predetermined district
attributes. As is standard in the literature, we adopt Poisson estimation on a speci￿cation similar to
(8), but using birth counts per district-year as the dependent variable (Guimarªes, Figueiredo and
Woodward, 2003; Arzaghi and Henderson, 2008). The results reported in column (1) show that the
above ￿ndings remain qualitatively unaltered when birth counts are used instead. Entry of private
centers is signi￿cantly higher in richer city districts. In columns (2) to (4) we examine the extent to
17The extrapolated data are then de￿ated using the CPI for Sªo Paulo from Funda￿ªo Instituto de Pesquisas
Econ￿micas.
12which the results are sensitive to the use of 2000 ￿gures for district attributes: column (2) presents
estimates based on linearly extrapolated district attributes, while column (3) in turn presents the
results based on 1991 ￿gures. In both cases, the results remain very similar to those reported in
column (1).18 Finally, in columns (4) and (5) we assess the extent to which entry decisions might be
in￿uenced by the number and size of existing public centers. Consistent with the results presented
previously, the estimates provide little evidence that public child care provision in￿uences the
location choices of private providers. Overall, thus, the results suggest that the market approach
leads to greater availability of child care centers in higher-income markets, despite the higher costs
of property.
A potential concern with this interpretation is that the differential patterns of entry across dis-
tricts might stem from lower intrinsic motivation of poorer households to enroll their children in
child care services, even at zero tuition. This might happen, for instance, if mothers in poorer
districts were less willing to participate in the labor market. Two related pieces of evidence argue
against this hypothesis, however. First, the estimates reported in Table 4 suggest that, conditional
on the number of children of child care age, newly-created public establishments tended to open
primarily in lower-income city districts. Second, estimates of the local government point to sizable
waiting lists for enrollment in public child care establishments in lower-income city districts.19
5.2 Quality Choices across Districts
The theoretical framework we adopt suggests that private providers have an incentive to adjust
the quality of provision to the attributes of the local population, notably their willingness to pay
for quality. To investigate this hypothesis empirically we estimate regressions at the center level,
relating several proxies of center quality to district attributes. Speci￿cally, we adopt the following
speci￿cation:
qualityijt = Xjt￿ + ￿t + "jit (9)
where qualityijt is an indicator of quality of center i located in district j in year t, where Xjt and
￿t have the meaning de￿ned above.20
18All results in the paper are insensitive to the use district attributes for 1991, 2000 or extrapolating to the period
2000-2006. Hence in the remainder of the paper we will report only the results obtained with ￿gures for the year 2000.
19In June 2008, Sªo Paulo’s local government announced that 146,834 children were in waiting list for child care
services in the city, the majority of whom were in poor city districts. This amounts to 36 percent of total enrollment
in public child care establishments at the time. See, e.g., "Em Sªo Paulo, faltam 146, 834 vagas na educa￿ªo infantil,
segundo a perfeitura. [In Sªo Paulo, there are 146,834 missing places in child care, according to the local government]"
UOL Portal Aprendiz, 06/16/2008.
20In line with the theoretical framework presented above, we will use information on observable inputs to measure
the quality of child care provision. Admittedly, there are other important dimensions of quality that available data do
not permit us to examine, notably the nature of adult-child interaction.
135.2.1 Teacher Schooling and Wages
We begin by analyzing how district attributes in￿uence average teacher quali￿cations in private
child care centers. Since Censo Escolar provides information detailed by grade, we estimate sep-
arate regressions for each of the two existing levels of child care provision in Brazil: day care and
preschool. The former are reported in Panel A of Table 5, and the latter in Panel B.21 In line with
the predictions of the model, the estimates reported in column (1) of Table 5 suggest that centers
located in higher-income, higher-education city districts tend to employ day care teachers with
higher levels of schooling than their counterparts in poorer districts. Column (2) shows that this
estimate remains virtually unaltered when controls for the size of the market are included. To see
whether quality differentials across locations are in￿uenced by the age of the child care centers,
we run separate regressions for private centers aged two years or less, and those older than two
years.22 It turns out that the coef￿cients are very similar across age groups, suggesting that pos-
sible heterogeneity of center age across districts is not driving the qualitative results. In Panel B
of Table 5, we run analogous regressions for preschool teachers in private centers. The results are
very similar to those reported in Panel A, as we would expect.
The theoretical framework presented in the previous section further predicts that in order to
attract higher quality teachers private centers located in higher-income city districts optimally pay
higher wages. To investigate this proposition empirically we use data on average teacher wages
for 85 child care centers in 2006/2007. Table 6 reports the results. Although the small size of this
sample recommends caution in interpreting these estimates, they do suggest that teacher wages
are signi￿cantly higher in private centers located in richer city districts. In Panel B, we further
examine whether average wages at the center level are signi￿cantly associated with the proportion
ofteachersthathaveattendedorconcludedhighereducationstudies. Inbothcases, theresultspoint
indeed to a positive correlation, although the parameter of interest is more precisely estimated in
column (2). The empirical results are therefore in line with the theoretical prediction that private
centers located in richer districts pay higher wages to attract more quali￿ed teachers, and thereby
provide higher quality child care services to appeal to richer consumers.23
21We have not separately examined entry decisions for day care and preschool because most private establishments
provide both levels of child care.
22The data used in this exercise are restricted to the 2002-2006 period, so that each establishment can be precisely
assigned to each age category.
23The model predicts that a similar pattern would prevail for auxiliary workers. Unfortunately, the data do not
allow us to investigate this hypothesis. Although the number of auxiliary workers employed in each establishment is
reported, we do not possess information on their quali￿cations or wages.
145.2.2 Group Size
We proceed by examining whether, in addition to teacher schooling, there are systematic differ-
ences in mean group size across city districts. While the theoretical framework presented above
does not model explicitly center choices of group size, intuitively we would expect this important
indicator of quality to be in￿uenced as well by consumers’ willingness to pay for quality. In fact,
in the model of Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009) class size is the sole dimension of quality that
private primary schools are assumed to adjust in order to appeal to higher-income consumers. Due
to the absence of strict legal restrictions on group size, Sªo Paulo’s child care market provides an
interesting setting to examine this question.
As before, we estimate separate regressions for day care and preschool services. The estimates
reported in Table 7 point indeed to the existence of systematic differences in group size across
city districts: private centers located in higher-income city districts run signi￿cantly smaller group
sizes than their counterparts in poorer districts. The estimates suggest that doubling a district’s
income per capita reduces the average group size in day care by about 20 percent; in analogous
regressions for preschool, the corresponding estimates are 12 percent. The extent of heterogeneity
is therefore sizable, taking into account that the distribution of mean income across locations is
very wide (Figure 2).
These results complement and extend those of Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009) in two impor-
tant ways. First, they show that a key insight of their work￿that group size varies endogenously
with household income￿is not speci￿c to private primary schools nor to the more regulated Chilean
market. Second, they suggest that the heterogeneity of group size in child care has a strong geo-
graphic dimension, even within a single municipality.
5.2.3 Equipment
The model also predicts that in order to provide higher quality services private centers located in
higher-income districts will choose to employ more sophisticated equipment. We investigate this
hypothesis empirically using information on several items at the center level provided by Censo
Escolar. Table 8 reports the results.24 Consistent with the model, we ￿nd that private centers
located in higher-income city districts tend to employ signi￿cantly more computers per child than
their counterparts in lower-income districts, and are also more likely to have adequate sanitation
for preschool and a refrigerator.25
24Data on equipment are available only at the establishment level. To improve comparability across establishments,
we restrict the analysis to establishments providing both day care and preschool.
25Some caution is needed in interpreting the results on computers per child, as we have no information on the extent
to which they are used for pedagogical or administrative purposes.
155.2.4 Quality in Public Centers
As we noted above, the positive association between teacher quali￿cations, wages and local in-
come per capita is consistent with the mechanisms emphasized by the theoretical model presented
in Section 3. A possible concern, however, is that this pattern might be explained by alternative
mechanisms, notably heterogeneity and segmentation in the teacher labor market. To investigate
this alternative hypothesis further, we examine the extent to which a similar pattern can be identi-
￿ed for public establishments, which are not motivated by pro￿t and recruit from the same labor
market. Table 9 reports the results. For day care, the estimated coef￿cients are insigni￿cant and
close to zero. For preschool, they are positive and signi￿cant, but always of considerably smaller
magnitude than those reported in Table 5. Overall, therefore, these results suggest that heterogene-
ity in the inputs market across districts is not the main driver of our results.
For completeness, we also examine the extent to which quality differentials across districts
can also be identi￿ed for other center inputs in the public sector. Tables 10 and 11 report the
results. Thecoef￿cientsofinteresttendtobelesspreciselyestimatedthaninequivalentregressions
for the private sector, and suggest that if any positive relation between establishment quality and
household income exists, it is considerably smaller in magnitude. Taken together, these results
suggest that the quality of private centers is considerably more heterogeneous than that of their
public counterparts, as would be expected if quality differentials in the private sector were mainly
driven by ￿rms’ pro￿t-maximizing behavior and heterogeneity in consumers’ willingness to pay
for quality across locations.
6 Minimum Quality Standards
Should child care markets be regulated? In recent years this question has been subject to great
interest and debate, but controversy remains. Advocates of regulation have emphasized the im-
portance of ensuring adequate standards of quality and safety, so as to preclude negative public
externalities arising from low-quality services and address imperfect parental ability to assess or
monitor the quality of care (e.g., Walker, 1991; Mocan, 2007). It has also been noted, however,
that the regulation of child care inputs may have unintended impacts on the supply of market-based
services. Most empirical studies in this vein focus on the U.S. market and exploit cross-sectional
variation in regulations between states to identify their effects. Against a background of impor-
tant data limitations, the general conclusion seems to be that more stringent regulations reduce
the availability and utilization of child care centers (Gormley, 1991; Lowenberg and Tinnin, 1992;
Blau 2003, 2007).
In in￿uential work, Hotz and Xiao (2010) examine U.S. panel data on state regulations and
16childcarecenters, andconcludethattheimpositionofmorestringentminimumstandardsgenerates
winners and losers, the latter of whom tend to be concentrated in low-income areas. In particular,
they provide evidence that the regulation of child care inputs: (1) reduces the number of child
care centers, especially in low-income markets; and (2) increases the quality of provision, as as
measured by the share of centers accredited by an independent authority, especially in high-income
areas. Importantly, however, the analysis of establishment quality is made dif￿cult by the fact that
input quality cannot be directly observed, and only a small proportion of very high-quality centers
are accredited.
This section provides complementary evidence to this literature. We begin by examining
whether an unregulated market leads to adequate levels of quality and safety. Building on this
evidence, we then use the theoretical model of Section 3 to discuss speci￿c channels whereby reg-
ulations might be expected to impact on the availability and quality of child care. In doing so, we
draw implications for empirical work seeking to estimate the impact of regulations on the supply
and quality of care.
6.1 Does an Unregulated Market Deliver Adequate Quality?
We begin by examining the proportion of centers that operate below adequate quality standards
on child care inputs. To this end we use the minimum standards recommended (but not imposed)
by the Brazilian authorities on group size and teacher quali￿cations. For comparison, we also
consider regulations effectively applied in different U.S .states. For each input, we order U.S.
states by degree of regulatory stringency in 1996 and recover the minimum quality standard in the
10th, 50th and 90th percentile of this distribution.26 Using cross-sectional data for 2006, we then
compute the proportion of "non-compliant" centers in each of three groups of districts, de￿ned on
the basis of their income per capita in the year 2000.
Table 9 reports the results. They suggest that a signi￿cant proportion of child care centers
operates below recommended (but not imposed) quality standards. For instance, the share of day
care centers operating below the minimum standards recommended by Brazilian authorities on
group size and teacher quali￿cations was 12.4 percent and 35.4 percent, respectively. In general,
the share of centers operating below adequate standards of quality is especially high for day care
services, though the number of preschool services operating below the recommended threshold is
non-negligible.27 Furthermore, there is clear evidence that the proportion of centers that do not
satisfy adequate standards is particularly high in poorer city districts, as one would expect in the
26We use data for 1996, as this is the latest year for which we have consistent data on these regulations. U.S.
regulations are de￿ned by age, and so we are able to compute averages for day care and preschool services.
27A possible explanation for these differences between day care and preschool is that the number of public child
care centers providing day care is relatively small compared to preschool. Greater availability of public centers might
deter low-income households from resorting to low-quality private child care services.
17light of the evidence reported in the previous section. For example, 51.5 percent of day care ser-
vices in low-income districts operate below the minimum standards on teacher quali￿cations in day
care recommended by Brazilian authorities, clearly above the corresponding share in high-income
districts (21.4 percent). Similar patterns are observed when using U.S. effective regulations.
6.2 Regulations, Entry and Quality
How might we expect the imposition and enforcement of regulations to affect the supply and
quality of child care? The model presented in Section 3 and the empirical ￿ndings we have doc-
umented are consistent with the estimates reported by Hotz and Xiao (2010). In the context of
the equilibrium patterns represented in Figure 4, let us assume that a minimum quality standard
qm is imposed, which applies to every child care center in the city. In this situation, a city-wide
minimum quality standard is more likely to be binding for centers located in district P than in R.
The number of centers that not longer ￿nd it pro￿table to operate in market due to the introduction
of qm is therefore larger in district P than in R. Assume now that qa denotes the minimum quality
that centers must satisfy in order to be accredited by an independent authority. If qa is suf￿ciently
high, only a small fraction of high-quality centers located in the high-income district are able to
obtain accreditation.28 By deterring entry (or inducing exit) of less able providers in district R, the
introduction of qm increases the share of accredited centers in that market.
However, from Figure 4 it is also clear that by deterring entry of low-productivity, low-quality
providers, the imposition of regulations would likely lead to improvements in the average quality
of care, especially in low-income districts. This process need not translate into higher accred-
itation rates, however, as the quality supplied by the most productive providers in low income
districts is still below the threshold required for accreditation. Moreover, this framework sug-
gests that caution is needed in establishing a direct link between entry patterns and enrollment: in
the long term, reduced entry of low-productivity providers due to regulations would likely enable
higher-productivity, higher-quality suppliers to expand (cf. eq. (6)). Although this expansion may
plausibly occur at the expense of lower quality in each center (e.g., due to larger group sizes), the
average quality of supply might nevertheless increase as a result of the reallocation of households
to higher-productivity providers. Hence the ability of directly observing adjustments in input qual-
ity and enrollment following the imposition of regulations plays (should play) a key role in future
empirical work seeking to estimate their short and long-run impacts on the utilization and quality
of child care.
28Notice that Hotz and Xiao (2010) report that only a small fraction of child care centers are accredited (9.7 percent
of the total in 1997), re￿ecting the fact that only very high quality establishments are able to comply with the standards
of the National Association of Education for Young Children.
187 Concluding Remarks
In recent years many countries have turned to the market approach for expanding the supply of
child care, but little is known about the implications of this policy option for the availability and
quality of care. This paper has contributed to ￿lling this gap in the literature by examining the role
of local household income in shaping the entry and quality choices of private child care providers.
To this end we have exploited uniquely rich administrative data on child care centers and their
inputs from one of the world’s largest urban centers: Sªo Paulo, Brazil.
The results reveal that the market approach leads to considerable heterogeneity in the avail-
ability and quality of child care services across locations. Entry rates of independent providers
are considerably higher in higher-income city districts. In addition, the quality of private child
care￿as measured by teachers’ schooling, group size and equipment￿varies greatly across space
and increases systematically with local household income. Indeed, in the absence of regulation a
considerable proportion of centers operates below recommended standards of quality and safety,
especially in low-income city districts. We have used a theoretical model with optimizing be-
havior and heterogeneity on both sides of the market as the basic framework to understand these
relationships. The model accords well with the facts and emphasizes important channels whereby
regulations might affect the supply and quality of care in child care markets.
From a public policy perspective, our overall reading of the results is that a combination of reg-
ulations and publicly funded provision directed towards low-income areas plays (should play) an
important role in ensuring more equitable access to developmentally-enriching child care services.
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 Figure 3. Income Per Capita and Adult Education in the 96 Districts, 2000 
 
Source: Perfeitura da Cidade de São Paulo (2007). 
 
Figure 4. Income Per Capita and Number of Children Aged 0 to 6 in the 96 Districts, 2000 
 
  Source: SEADE. 
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   Source: Authors’ compilation. 
Figure A.1. Within-District Evolution of Income Per Capita, 1991-2000 
 
  Source: Perfeitura da Cidade de São Paulo (2007). 
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 Table 1. Summary Statistics, 2000-2006 
 
Mean St. Dev. N
City district variables
Income per capita, 1991 (reais per month) 610.86 417.28 96
Income per capita, 2000 (reais per month) 783.11 642.79 96
Real income per capita, 2000-2006 extrapolated (2000 prices) 679.81 584.99 96
Av. years of schooling pop. > 25 years old, 1991 6.81 1.93 96
Av. years of schooling pop. > 25 years old, 2000 8.16 1.96 96
Av. years of schooling pop. > 25 years old, 2000-2006 extrapolated 8.60 2.00 672
Population aged between 0 and 6 13086.93 10238.19 672
Number of private centers 24.01 15.40 672
Number of public centers 7.98 6.57 672
Private enrolment 1914.28 1082.38 672
Public enrolment 3036.03 2585.90 672
Private center variables
% of teachers that have some higher education (day care 0-3) 0.19 0.35 11029
% of teachers that have some higher education (preschool 4-6) 0.39 0.40 13146
Av. teacher wage (reais per month) 1695.36 996.12 85
Av. group size (day care 0-3) 11.89 7.20 11029
Av. group size (preschool 4-6) 12.14 5.94 13146
Has playground? (Yes=1) 0.93 0.25 8127
Has adequate sanitation for preschool? (Yes=1) 0.91 0.28 8127
Has fridge? (Yes=1) 0.95 0.22 8127
Computers per child 0.11 0.25 8127
Public center variables
% of teachers that have attended higher education (day care 0-3) 0.12 0.25 2287
% of teachers that have attended higher education (preschool 4-6) 0.63 0.31 4039
Average group size (day care 0-3) 15.26 5.29 2287
Average group size (preschool 4-6) 31.33 6.89 4039
Has playground? (Yes=1) 0.83 0.38 963
Has adequate sanitation for preschool? (Yes=1) 0.93 0.25 963
Has fridge? (Yes=1) 0.97 0.17 963
Computers per child 0.01 0.02 963
Source: Authors’ computations based on data described in Section 4. 









Table 2. Number of Private Child Care Centers 
 
Dependent variable: Number of private centers 2000 2003 2006 2000-2006 2000-2006 2000 2003 2006 2000-2006 2000-2006
extrapol. extrapol.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A
Log population aged between 0 and 6 0.668*** 0.734*** 0.753*** 0.715*** 0.720*** 0.627*** 0.688*** 0.709*** 0.655*** 0.656***
(0.088) (0.087) (0.079) (0.081) (0.080) (0.130) (0.125) (0.119) (0.115) (0.113)
Log income per capita 0.915*** 0.806*** 0.678*** 0.784*** 0.749*** 0.928*** 0.821*** 0.696*** 0.806*** 0.772***
(0.096) (0.097) (0.091) (0.092) (0.085) (0.095) (0.095) (0.091) (0.091) (0.085)
Number of public centers 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.011 0.012
(0.017) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Year dummies No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Log-pseudolikelihood -462.25 -491.744 -524.142 -3494.469 -3484.68 -461.577 -490.672 -523.044 -3481.789 -3469.699
N 96 96 96 672 672 96 96 96 672 672
Panel B
Log population aged between 0 and 6 0.715*** 0.791*** 0.814*** 0.770*** 0.773*** 0.690*** 0.767*** 0.786*** 0.726*** 0.734***
(0.078) (0.077) (0.068) (0.071) (0.071) (0.110) (0.112) (0.105) (0.100) (0.102)
Log average years of schooling pop. > 25 years old 3.050*** 2.719*** 2.321*** 2.642*** 2.778*** 3.072*** 2.739*** 2.351*** 2.686*** 2.816***
(0.249) (0.255) (0.236) (0.239) (0.253) (0.255) (0.258) (0.246) (0.246) (0.257)
Number of public centers 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.006
(0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Year dummies No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Log-pseudolikelihood -442.113 -467.759 -499.155 -3337.114 -3314.022 -441.883 -467.487 -498.742 -3330.659 -3308.964
N 96 96 96 672 672 96 96 96 672 672
Source: Authors’ computations based on data described in Section 4. 
Notes: The estimation method is Poisson. The unit of observation is district-year. *** Significant at the 1 percent level; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; * 
Significant at the 10 percent level. Robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered by city district. Column titles present the period of analysis for each 
specification. Results in columns (5) and (10) are based on district attributes for 2000-2006, linearly extrapolated from 1991 and 2000 values; results in all other 
columns are based on 2000 district attributes. 
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Table 3. Entry of Private Child Care Centers 
 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A
Log population aged between 0 and 6 0.749*** 0.768*** 0.660*** 0.778*** 0.851***
(0.101) (0.103) (0.0950) (0.144) (0.151)
Log income per capita 0.372*** 0.372*** 0.312** 0.364*** 0.337***
(0.119) (0.113) (0.142) (0.123) (0.130)
Number of public centers (lagged 1 year) -0.005
(0.017)
Enrollment in public centers (lagged 1 year)*1000 -0.041
(0.049)
Log-pseudolikelihood -1401.258 -1398.524 -1411.423 -1401.023 -1398.866
N 576 576 576 576 576
Panel B
Log population aged between 0 and 6 0.819*** 0.831*** 0.790*** 0.856*** 0.921***
(0.103) (0.105) (0.100) (0.144) (0.149)
Log average years of schooling pop. > 25 years old 1.426*** 1.559*** 1.118*** 1.401*** 1.335***
(0.347) (0.375) (0.280) (0.355) (0.372)
Number of public centers (lagged 1 year) -0.006
(0.017)
Enrollment in public centers (lagged 1 year)*1000 -0.039
(0.048)
Log-pseudolikelihood -1391.154 -1389.045 -1394.670 -1390.814 -1388.922
N 576 576 576 576 576
2001-2006
Source: Authors’ computations based on data described in Section 4. 
Notes: The estimation method is Poisson. The unit of observation is district-year. All regressions include year 
dummies. *** Significant at the 1 percent level; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; * Significant at the 10 percent 




 Table 4. Births of Public Child Care Centers 
Dependent variable: Births of public centers
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A
Log population aged between 0 and 6 0.647*** 0.446** 0.507***
(0.127) (0.184) (0.184)
Log income per capita -0.607*** -0.904*** -0.779***
(0.173) (0.255) (0.223)
Number of private centers (lagged 1 year) 0.014*
(0.008)
Enrolment in private centers (lagged 1 year)*1000 0.123
(0.098)
Log-pseudolikelihood -386.506 -384.359 -385.451
N 576 576 576
Panel B
Log population aged between 0 and 6 0.711*** 0.577*** 0.639***
(0.131) (0.208) (0.199)
Log average years of schooling pop. > 25 years old -1.404*** -1.951** -1.648***
(0.464) (0.759) (0.636)
Number of private centers (lagged 1 year) 0.009
(0.010)
Enrolment in private centers (lagged 1 year)*1000 0.061
(0.108)
Log-pseudolikelihood -388.977 -388.059 -388.716
N 576 576 576
2001-2006
 
Source: Authors’ computations based on data described in Section 4. 
Notes: The estimation method is Poisson. The unit of observation is district-year. All 
regressions include year dummies. *** Significant at the 1 percent level; ** Significant at the 
5 percent level; * Significant at the 10 percent level. Robust standard errors in parenthesis 




Table 5. Teacher Qualifications in Private Centers 
 
Dependent variable: % of teachers that have some higher education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Day Care
Log income per capita 0.143*** 0.156*** 0.158*** 0.168*** 0.154*** 0.177***
(0.010) (0.015) (0.011) (0.016) (0.012) (0.021)
Log population aged between 0 and 6 0.015 0.013 0.028
(0.012) (0.012) (0.018)
R2 0.098 0.099 0.103 0.103 0.090 0.091
N 11029 11029 5010 5010 3404 3404
Panel B: Preschool
Log income per capita 0.161*** 0.162*** 0.164*** 0.169*** 0.171*** 0.175***
(0.014) (0.023) (0.016) (0.025) (0.015) (0.024)
Log population aged between 0 and 6 0.001 0.006 0.005
(0.022) (0.025) (0.021)
R2 0.092 0.092 0.091 0.091 0.087 0.087
N 13146 13146 5924 5924 4132 4132
All center age >2 center age <3
Source: Authors’ computations based on data described in Section 4. 
Notes: The estimation method is OLS. The unit of observation is center-year. All regressions include year dummies. In columns (1) 
and (2) the period of analysis is 2000-2006. In columns (3) to (6), the period of analysis is 2002-2006 so that age categories can be 
determined. Local income  per capita is measured in the year 2000. *** Significant at the 1 percent level;** Significant at the 5 





Table 6. Teacher Wages in Private Centers 
 
Dependent variable: Log average teacher wage
(1) (2)
Panel A
Log income per capita, 2000 0.412***
(0.091)





% of teachers that attended higher education 0.297
(0.186)







Source: Authors’ computations based on data described in Section 4. 
Notes: The estimation method is OLS. The unit of observation is 
center-year. *** Significant at the 1 percent level; ** Significant at 
the 5 percent level; * Significant at the 10 percent level.  Robust 






 Table 7. Group Size in Private Centers 
 
Dependent variable: log group class size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Day Care
Log income per capita -0.211*** -0.194*** -0.199*** -0.186*** -0.179*** -0.154***
(0.031) (0.045) (0.030) (0.045) (0.031) (0.044)
Log population aged between 0 and 6 0.020 0.015 0.031
(0.045) (0.046) (0.044)
R2 0.062 0.062 0.060 0.060 0.049 0.049
N 11029 11029 5010 5010 3404 3404
Panel B: Preschool
Log income per capita -0.127*** -0.112*** -0.125*** -0.124*** -0.138*** -0.101***
(0.017) (0.022) (0.021) (0.026) (0.021) (0.029)
Log population aged between 0 and 6 0.019 0.002 0.045
(0.027) (0.030) (0.033)
R2 0.038 0.039 0.043 0.043 0.040 0.041
N 13146 13146 5924 5924 4132 4132
All center age >2 center age <3
Source: Authors’ computations based on data described in Section 4. 
Notes: The estimation method is OLS. The unit of observation is center-year. All regressions include year 
dummies. In columns (1) and (2) the period of analysis is 2000-2006. In columns (3) to (6), the period of 
analysis is 2002-2006 so that age categories can be determined. Local income per capita is measured in the 
year 2000.  *** Significant at the 1 percent level; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; * Significant at the 10 






 Table 8. Equipment in Private Centers 
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log income per capita 0.039*** 0.053*** 0.025*** 0.027** 0.008 0.008 0.014** 0.025***
(0.009) (0.013) (0.008) (0.012) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009)
Log population aged between 0 and 6 0.018 0.003 0.001 0.013*
(0.015) (0.014) (0.009) (0.007)
Log pseudolikelihood -2350.78 -2350.70 -1918.35 -1918.32 -1623.53 -1620.30
R2 0.011 0.012
N 8127 8127 8127 8127 8127 8127 8127 8127






Source: Authors’ computations based on data described in Section 4. 
Notes: The estimation method in columns (1) and (2) is OLS. The unit of observation is center-year. In columns (3) 
to (8) the method is Probit, from which marginal effects are reported.. Data for child care establishments providing 
both day care and preschool are used. Local income per capita is measured in the year 2000. All regressions include  
year dummies. *** Significant at the 1 percent level; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; * Significant at the 10 











 Table 9. Teacher Qualifications in Public Centers 
Dependent variable: % of teachers with higher education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Day Care
Log income per capita 0.017 0.018 0.012 -0.001 0.035 0.063
(0.012) (0.020) (0.016) (0.026) (0.025) (0.039)
Log population aged between 0 and 6 0.0005 -0.014 0.031
(0.016) (0.022) (0.028)
R2 0.201 0.201 0.150 0.151 0.124 0.126
N 2287 2287 1084 1084 659 659
Panel B: Preschool
Log income per capita 0.096*** 0.068*** 0.098*** 0.069*** 0.072*** 0.036
(0.016) (0.023) (0.018) (0.026) (0.026) (0.033)
Log population aged between 0 and 6 -0.032* -0.034* -0.040
(0.019) (0.020) (0.033)
R2 0.111 0.113 0.133 0.136 0.084 0.086
N 4039 4039 2128 2128 1086 1086
All estab. age >2 estab. age <3
 
Source: Authors’ computations based on data described in Section 4. 
Notes: The estimation method is OLS. The unit of observation is center-year. All regressions include year dummies. 
In columns (1) and (2) the period of analysis is 2000-2006. In columns (3) to (6), the period of analysis is 2002-2006 
so that age categories can be determined. Local income per capita is measured in the year 2000.  *** Significant at 
the 1 percent level; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; * Significant at the 10 percent level. Robust standard errors 
in parenthesis clustered by city district. 
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 Table 10. Group Size in Public Centers 
 
Dependent variable: log average class size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Day Care
Log income per capita -0.102*** -0.089** -0.132*** -0.098** -0.010* -0.104
(0.031) (0.042) (0.031) (0.046) (0.054) (0.065)
Log population aged between 0 and 6 0.015 0.040 -0.005
(0.028) (0.035) (0.041)
R2 0.241 0.241 0.389 0.392 0.132 0.132
N 2287 2287 1084 1084 659 659
Panel B: Preschool
Log income per capita -0.019 -0.034** -0.009 -0.031* -0.019 -0.042
(0.012) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017) (0.022) (0.040)
Log population aged between 0 and 6 -0.018 -0.026* -0.027
(0.015) (0.013) (0.040)
R2 0.138 0.139 0.073 0.074 0.104 0.105
N 4039 4039 2128 2128 1086 1086
All estab. age >2 estab. age <3
Source: Authors’ computations based on data described in Section 4. 
Notes: The estimation method is OLS. The unit of observation is center-year. All regressions include year 
dummies. In columns (1) and (2) the period of analysis is 2000-2006. In columns (3) to (6), the period of 
analysis is 2002-2006 so that age categories can be determined. Local income per capita is measured in 
the year 2000.  *** Significant at the 1 percent level; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; * Significant at 





 Table 11. Equipment in Public Centers 
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log income per capita 0.011** 0.013** 0.015 0.028 0.015 0.011 -0.003 0.0003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.022) (0.033) (0.031) (0.043) (0.010) (0.017)
Log population aged between 0 and 6 0.003 0.015 -0.004 0.003
(0.002) (0.021) (0.033) (0.014)
Log pseudolikelihood -237.723 -237.119 -422.176 -422.152 -120.431 -120.409
R2 0.062 0.065






Has playground? Has fridge?
 
Source: Authors’ computations based on data described in Section 4. 
Notes: The estimation method in columns (1) to (2) is OLS. In columns (3) to (8) it is Probit, from which 
marginal effects are reported. Data for child care establishments providing both day care and preschool are 
used. *** Significant at the 1 percent level; ** Significant at the 5 percent level; * Significant at the 10 percent 









Table 12. Proportion of Private Centers Operating below Minimum Quality Standards, 2006 
 
Source: Data on recommended minimum standards for São Paulo come from SEBRAE (2005). Data on US regulations come from Hotz and Xiao 
(2010) 
All High-inc Med-inc Low-inc All High-inc Med-inc Low-inc All High-inc Med-inc Low-inc
Brazil recommended 12.4 10.1 9.2 19.3  -  -  -  - 35.4 21.4 36.1 51.5
U.S. 10th percentile 9.6 6.9 6.9 16.3 40.6 29.9 42.2 52.0 35.4 21.4 36.1 51.5
U.S. 50th percentile 24.6 20.5 21.2 34.0 57.7 48.3 58.7 67.9 35.4 21.4 36.1 51.5
U.S. 90th percentile 56.6 51.2 53.2 67.4 79.0 71.3 80.6 86.7 82.7 71.6 85.2 93.2
Brazil recommended 4.5 2.7 4.3 6.6  -  -  -  - 1.9 1.7 1.6 2.2
U.S. 10th percentile 1.7 0.8 2.3 2.1 15.9 9.0 16.0 23.3 1.9 1.7 1.6 2.2
U.S. 50th percentile 8.2 4.7 6.9 13.4 32.9 22.4 32.7 44.8 1.9 1.7 1.6 2.2
U.S. 90th percentile 17.1 11.0 14.6 26.7 46.8 32.6 45.4 64.0 75.8 57.8 75.7 89.5
Group size Staff-ratio Teacher qualifications
Panel A: Day care
Panel B: Preschool
Minimum standards
Notes: The distribution of US regulations across states refers to the year 1996. For each state, we consider average regulations for day care and 
preschool. 
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